On the topologic structure of economic complex networks: Empirical
  evidence from large scale payment network of Estonia by de la Torre, Stephanie Rendón et al.
1 
 
On the topologic structure of economic complex networks:  
empirical evidence from large scale payment network of Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephanie Rendón de la Torre
* 
, Jaan Kalda
*
, Robert Kitt
*1
, Jüri Engelbrecht
* 
*Institute of Cybernetics at Tallinn University of Technology, Akadeemia tee 21, 12618, Tallinn, ESTONIA 
1Swedbank AS, Liivalaia 12, 15038, Tallinn, ESTONIA 
________________________________________________________ 
 
This paper presents the first topological analysis of the economic structure of an entire 
country based on payments data obtained from Swedbank. This data set is exclusive in its 
kind because around 80% of Estonia's bank transactions are done through Swedbank, hence, 
the economic structure of the country can be reconstructed. Scale-free networks are 
commonly observed in a wide array of different contexts such as nature and society. In this 
paper, the nodes are comprised by customers of the bank (legal entities) and the links are 
established by payments between these nodes. We study the scaling-free and structural 
properties of this network. We also describe its topology, components and behaviors. We 
show that this network shares typical structural characteristics known in other complex 
networks: degree distributions follow a power law, low clustering coefficient and low average 
shortest path length. We identify the key nodes of the network and perform simulations of 
resiliency against random and targeted attacks of the nodes with two different approaches. 
With this, we find that by identifying and studying the links between the nodes is possible to 
perform vulnerability analysis of the Estonian economy with respect to economic shocks.  
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1. Introduction 
The network approach applied to financial and economic systems has potential to go further 
on the frontiers of research; there are two currents of origin: one comes from finances, 
economics and sociology, and the second one comes from computer science, big data 
challenges, physics, and complex evolving network studies [1]. Both converge in how node 
representation is done and how the relationships and interactions across the nodes form, 
whatsoever the nature of these links are. This is an intuitive path that starts to follow the 
approach that fusions economy and complex systems studies. 
Nowadays, networks are a central concept and they can be: biological, technological, 
economic, social, cultural, among other types. The physical approach has made significant 
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effort during the recent years around the study of evolution and structure of networks 
[2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9] while some other works have been dedicated to certain network phenomena 
and specific properties [10,11].  
Since the structure of a network has direct influence on the vulnerability and dynamic 
behavior of the underlying system, important network properties such as stability and 
robustness can be understood by analyzing the clustering coefficient, the degree distribution 
and by determining the average shortest path length between nodes in the network [12,13]. 
In networks, the degree distribution P(k) is the probability that a node links to k number of 
nodes. Complex networks can be separated into two classes based on their degree 
distributions:  
1) Homogeneous networks are identified by degree distributions that follow an exponential 
decay. The distribution spikes at an average k and then decays exponentially for large values 
of k, such as the random graph model [14,15] and the small-world model [4], both leading to 
an homogeneous network: in which each node has approximately the same number of links k 
and a normal distribution where the majority of the nodes has an average number of 
connections, and only some or none of the nodes have only some or lots of connections.  
2) Heterogeneous large networks or scale-free networks, are those for which P(k) decays as a 
power law with a characteristic scale. The degree distribution follows a Pareto form of 
distribution where many nodes have few links and few nodes have many links, therefore, 
highly connected nodes are statistically significant in scale-free networks. 
Network topology gives a fair basis for investigating money flows of customer driven banking 
transactions. A few recent papers describe the actual topologies observed in different financial 
systems [13,16,17,18,19]. Other works have focused on shocks and robustness in economic 
complex networks [20,21,22,23,24].  
Scale-free networks display a strong tolerance against random removal of nodes [14] whereas 
exponential networks not (this means an exponential network can break easily into isolated 
clusters). Scale-free networks are more resistant to random disconnection of nodes because 
one can eliminate a considerable number of nodes randomly and the network's structure is 
preserved and will not break into disconnected clusters. However, the error tolerance is 
acquired at the expense of survival attack capability. When the most connected nodes are 
targeted, the diameter of a scale-free network increases and the network breaks into isolated 
clusters. This occurs because when removing these nodes, the damage disturbs the heart of the 
system, whereas a random attack is most likely not. One way to entangle the interaction of the 
nodes is by taking a look to the heavy tail effects they produce and see the implications on 
their robustness. Heavy-tailed distributions are strong against random perturbations but are 
extremely sensitive to targeted attacks.  
Unlike previous studies, we illustrate the topology of an unstudied complex system that can 
be analyzed as a particular case of a complex network: Estonia’s network of payments. We 
study the full country economic development, found on Swedbank’s data as a proxy. The 
main goal of our analysis is to study the structure of this economic network. Additionally, this 
data set is unique given the fact that around 80% of Estonia's bank transactions are done 
through Swedbank, hence it is expected to reproduce fairly well the structure of the Estonian 
economy. 
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This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide the description of the selected data 
and the methods utilized; section 3 is devoted to the discussion of the results and section 4 
concludes the study. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1 Data 
 
Payment events data from Swedbank AS were used to create the network. Data and 
information related to identities of the nodes will remain confidential and cannot be disclosed. 
We believe the utilized data describes fairly well the tendencies of money transactions and is 
the best possible information available. 
 
The considered dataset corresponds to year 2014. We analyze the network of the payment 
flows of Swedbank (Estonia), specifically: domestic payments transferred electronically from 
customer to customer (legal entities). There are 16,613 nodes and 2,617,478 payment 
transactions in the network. There are 43,375 links if we count them as undirected.   
A network (or a graph) is a set of nodes connected by links. The links are the connections 
between the nodes. In our network, the nodes are the companies and a link is established from 
one node to another if at least 20 payments were executed, or more than 1,000 money units 
were paid/received per year. When there is a link from a node to itself, it is called a loop. We 
eliminated loops resulting from parties making money transfers across their own bank 
accounts. 
 
There are several ways to define the network of payments; in this study we consider three 
definitions. The first definition is to look at the structure as a weighted graph where the links 
have certain weights associated to them representing less or higher important relationships 
with the nodes. Transactions between any two parties add to the associated link weights in 
terms of value of payments settled. In this representation we built a payment adjacency matrix 
that represents the whole image of the network and each element represents the overall money 
flow traded between companies i and j. This non-symmetric matrix represents the weights of 
the volumes of money exchanged between the companies. 
 
The second definition is to consider an undirected graph, ignoring directions and weights of 
the payments and considering that two parties are connected if they share at least one 
payment, then 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑢 = 𝑎𝑗𝑖
𝑢  and 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑢 = 1  if there is a transaction between company i and j or 
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑢 = 0 if there is no transaction between them. Diagonal elements are equal to 0 and non-
diagonal elements are either 0 or 1.  
 
The links can also represent directions on the flow of the relationship. They could be directed 
or undirected. The third definition is a un-weighted-directed graph where the links follow the 
flow of money, such that a link is incoming to the receiver and outgoing from the sender of 
the payment. For this case we have two more matrices, one for the in-degree case and another 
one for the out-degree case. The choice of the definition of the matrix representation depends 
on the focus of the analysis. 
 
2.2 Components  
 
Depending on how the nodes connect with each other, they can be partitioned into 
components. A component is a group of nodes such that any two nodes can be connected by a 
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direct or indirect path. A path is a sequence of different nodes, each one connected to the next 
node. A component of an undirected network is a set of nodes such that for any pair of nodes i 
and j there is a path from j to i; this means that two nodes share the same component if there 
is a path connecting them. Our analysis treats the network as both undirected and directed, 
and finds the components and their sizes. 
 
In a directed network the largest component is known as the Giant Weakly Connected 
Component (GWCC) in which all nodes connect to each other via undirected paths. The core 
is the Giant Strongly Connected Component in which the nodes can reach each other through 
a directed path. The Giant Out-Component (GOUT) comprises the nodes that have a path 
from the GSCC and the Giant In-Component (GIN) comprises the nodes that have a path to 
the GSCC. The set of disconnected components (DC) are smaller components. Tendrils are 
nodes that have no directed path to or from the GSCC, but to GOUT and or the GIN [2]. 
These concepts are shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Components of a directed network. 
In order to study the statistical properties and characterize the underlying structure of our 
network, we use specific useful network metrics [2,3,25]. 
 
3. Results 
 
Fig. 2(b) displays a picture of the network as a weighted directed graph where each link is 
shaded by the corresponding weight: with darker shades indicating higher values on the cash 
flows. The bigger nodes represent those nodes with higher amount of values transferred. Fig. 
2(a) shows the network as an undirected representation. This image includes 16,613 nodes 
and 43,374 links.             
 
  Fig. 2(a) Connectivity network of payments.             (b) Weighted-directed representation of the network. 
The high number of nodes and links makes difficult to have a detailed visualization of the 
graph's structure, therefore, we calculate topological and statistical measures that provide a 
clearer structure of the network. 
3.1 Topology structure 
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We find all the components in the undirected graph. We obtained that the GCC is composed 
by 15,434 nodes which means that 92.8% of the nodes are reachable from one another by 
following either forward or backward links, suggesting it is a very well connected network. 
The remaining 7.2% nodes correspond to 508 DC. If we take a directed approach, the GSCC 
contains 24% of the nodes in the system. 
A previous study of the structure of the WWW network components [25] focused on 
analyzing the robustness of the GCC against removal of nodes, and it was concluded that it is 
very difficult to destroy the structure of the WWW network by random elimination of links. 
(Table 3 displays the component sizes of the network of payments, among other statistics). 
The degree of a node is defined as 
𝑘𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 
𝑗∈𝜁(𝑖)
,                                                                                                                                         (1) 
 
the sum goes over the set 𝜁(𝑖) of neighbors of i. For example: 𝜁(𝑖) =  {𝑗|𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 1}.  
 
In a directed network there are two relevant characteristics of a node: the number of links that 
end at a node and the number of links that start from the node. These quantities are known as 
the out-degree k
o
 and the in-degree k
d
 of a node, and we define them as 
 
  𝑘𝑑 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑑
𝑗∈𝜁(𝑖)
 ,   𝑘𝑜 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑜
𝑗∈𝜁(𝑖)
.                                                                                                       (2) 
          
The average degree of a node in a network is the number of links divided by the number of 
nodes and is defined as 
 
〈𝑘〉 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑘 
𝑜 =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑘𝑑 =
𝑚
𝑛
 .                                                                                                      (3) 
One can categorize networks by the degree distributions shown in the tails. In random 
networks it is very common to find Poisson distributed links, but in complex system networks 
it is common to find a distribution that follows a power law 
𝑃(𝑘𝑖)~𝑘𝑖
−𝛾, 𝑘 ≠ 0,               (4) 
where 𝛾 is the scaling exponent of the distribution. This distribution is called scale-free and 
networks with such a degree distribution are referred to as scale-free networks because have 
no natural scale and the distribution remains unchanged within a multiplicative factor under a 
rescaling of the random variables [26]. 
The average degree of our network is 〈𝑘〉 =20. Most of the nodes have only 5 or less links, 
and 45% have only 1 link. Like other real networks, the degree distributions (undirected and 
directed) of the network of payments follow power laws. Fig. 3 displays the degree 
distributions. In all the distributions, we found regions that can be fitted by power laws, and 
this implies that the network has a scale-free structure. (We used the maximum likelihood 
estimation for obtaining the power law exponents [11]). The degree distribution in Fig. (3a) 
follows a power law with a scaling exponent: 
𝑃(≥ 𝑘) ∝ 𝑘−2.45.                           (5) 
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The in-degree distribution in Fig. (3b) follows a power law defined as 
𝑃(𝑘)~𝑘 
−2.49 .               (6) 
The out-degree distribution Fig. (3c) follows a power law defined as 
𝑃(𝑘)~𝑘 
−2.39 .               (7) 
In all the cases there is an area at the end of the tail that looks like a cut-off which can be 
explained by the fact that the system is finite and there is a maximum number of connections 
that a company could hold. 
  
                (a)                                                                 (b)             (c) 
Fig. 3 X axis corresponds to the number k of degrees and the Y axis is P(k). (a) Empirical degree distribution for the 
connectivity network. (b) Empirical in-degree distribution. (c) Empirical out-degree distribution. All the plots are log-log 
representations of histograms. 
 
In a random network, the degree distributions follow a Poisson distribution. A degree 
distribution following a power law distribution appears to be a common feature in complex 
networks such as the World Wide Web, proteins interactions, phone calls and food webs, 
among others, but also shown in systems of payments of different banks [16,17,18]. The 
degree distributions obtained here are comparable to those obtained in the aforementioned 
studies. Table 2 includes a limited list of the power-law exponents obtained in different types 
of real networks.  
 
3.2 Weight, strength, size and diameter 
The basic properties of a network are the number of nodes N and the overall number of links k 
(Table 1 shows the general characteristics of our network). The number of nodes defines the 
size of the network while the number of links relative to the number of possible links defines 
the connectivity of a network.    
Connectivity (p) is the unconditional probability that two nodes are connected by a direct link. 
For a directed network, connectivity is defined as 
 
(𝑝)  =
𝑘
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
 .                                                                                                                                   (8) 
 
In our case, the connectivity is 0.13 and this means the network is sparse because 87% of the 
potential connections are not used during the year. 
 
The diameter is the maximum distance between two companies (measured by the number of 
links) and in our network this distance is equal to 29. This number is substantially higher 
when compared to the diameter of a random network of comparable characteristics (19) and 
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this big difference in the diameter points to the existence of certain companies that send or 
receive money to other specific companies, and this contours specific and preferred paths for 
transactions. Intuitively this makes sense, because for companies in general, it is important to 
choose carefully their trading partners, clients, service providers or suppliers based on 
geographical location, affinity in the goals of the companies, cost policies, future joint 
ventures, agreements or any other reasons. 
 
The strength of the nodes is the sum of the weights of all the links. In this case, the strength 
measures the overall transaction volume for any given node. The node-weighted strength is 
defined as 
𝑠𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑗∈𝜁(𝑖)
,                                                                                                                                          (9) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the weight of the link between nodes i and j and the sum runs over the set 𝜁(𝑖) of 
neighbors of i. The average strength can be calculated as a function of the 𝑘 number of links 
of a node to examine the bond between the strength and the degree. 
Fig. (4a) displays the distribution of link weights weighted by the number of payments 
transacted. This distribution follows a power law. The same power law relationship occurs 
between the strength and the degree of a node Fig. (4b) and Fig. (4c). These results were fitted 
by power laws with the following scaling exponents: 
The volume link weight distribution 
𝑃(𝑤)~𝑤 
−1.98,                                   (10) 
where the scaling exponent is 1.98. 
The volume out-degree strength distribution 
 𝑃(𝑠)~𝑠 
−2.21  ,                               (11) 
where the scaling exponent is 2.21. 
The volume out-degree strength distribution 
𝑃(𝑠)~𝑠 
−2.32 ,                        (12) 
where the scaling exponent is 2.32. There are some deviations from the power law behavior 
but they are sufficiently small.                 
  
              (a)      (b)        (c) 
Fig. 4(a) Link weight distribution by volume. (b) Node in-degree distribution by strength. (c) Node out-degree distribution by 
strength.  
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3.3 Clustering, betweenness and average shortest path length 
 
The clustering coefficient of a node is the tendency to cluster; is the density around node i. It 
represents the proportion of the closest nodes of a node which are linked to each other. 
 
𝐶(𝑖) =
1
𝑘𝑖(𝑘𝑖 − 1)
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑎𝑗𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘.                                                                                                      (13)
𝑗≠𝑘
 
The overall clustering coefficient is the mean of the clustering coefficients 〈𝐶〉 of all the 
nodes. It indicates if there is a link between two companies who have a common trading 
partner. In our case, the average clustering coefficient is 0.183, suggestive of cliquishness in 
our network. This means that two companies that are trading partners with a third one, have 
an average probability of 18.3% to be trading partners with one another, than will any two 
other companies randomly chosen. The clustering coefficient across nodes is highly spread, as 
seen in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5 Distribution of the clustering coefficient. 
 
Fig. 5 shows that more than 52% of the nodes have a clustering coefficient of 0 or 1; 
therefore, the network is dispersed. There is ~9% probability that two neighbors of a node are 
linked whereas around 45% are not linked at all. This high level percentage of unlinked 
neighbor nodes can be explained by the high number of nodes with degrees equal to 1 which 
are very frequent in scale-free networks.  
 
Compared with other real networks this average clustering coefficient is low (See Table 2 for 
comparison). In this study, such a coefficient is fair. Business relationships between 
companies are commonly settled through medium or long term contracts. A company would 
like to remain doing business with the same parties (suppliers, clients, service providers, 
institutions, etcetera) because in general, it is easier and cheaper than changing them time 
after time. A change on a trading party could mean a decrease on profits or an increase on 
costs. A low clustering coefficient in our payment network reflects this perspective. 
 
In our case, the clustering coefficient is higher than the connectivity, therefore, the network is 
not random (in a random network the clustering coefficient is equal to the connectivity; a 
random network is built by randomly adding links to a given set of nodes). A random network 
of a comparable size has a clustering coefficient around 70 times lower than our network. 
Betweenness σ(m) of a node m is the total number of shortest paths between all possible pairs 
of nodes that pass through this node; it is a measure of the number of paths between other 
nodes that run through the node i; the more paths this node has, the more central is the node i 
in the network. It indicates whether or not a node is important in the traffic of the network. 
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𝜎(𝑚) ≡ ∑
𝐵(𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑗)
𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑖≠𝑗
 ,                                                                                                                       (14) 
where 𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗) is the total number of shortest paths between nodes i and j and the sum goes 
over all the pairs of nodes for which at least one path exists, with 𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗) > 0. The nodes with 
high betweenness control the network. 
The results in Table 2 show that the average betweenness for the links is 40 and for the nodes 
is 110, meaning that each company handles in average 110 shortest paths, and the higher is 
the number of shortest path the more central the company is for the network. 
The average shortest path length < l > was calculated with the Dijkstra's algorithm [27]. In 
the connectivity network this value is equal to 7.1. The network is a small world with 7.1 
degrees of separation, so in average any company can be reached by other one only in a few 
steps. Our network has low connectivity but it is densely connected. This characteristic is in 
line with the fact that there are companies that act as hubs or key nodes and lead to short 
distances between the other companies.  
93% of the nodes are within 7 links of distance from each other and this suggests that the 
network of payments is comprised of a core of nodes with whom the other companies interact 
with. There is a smaller group of 1,081 nodes (6.5% of the total number of nodes in the 
network) connected by high value links. This group contains weighted links that comprise 
75% of the overall value of the funds transferred. Fig. 6 shows the graph of the k-core. A k-
core in an undirected graph is a connected maximal induced sub-graph which has minimum 
degree greater than or equal to k. Alternatively, the k-core is the (unique) result of iteratively 
deleting nodes that have degree less than k, in any order. 
 
Fig. 6 Graph representation of the k-core. 
3.4 Robustness simulation and degree correlations 
One of the characteristics that makes a hub or a key node an important node is its high 
betweenness not just its high degree. Hubs often connect groups of clusters of sub-areas of the 
graph that are not connected to one another directly. These nodes are important because they 
shorten path lengths making for high reachability and fast movement of information. But they 
may also be important as brokers and key-players that connect the graph because of their 
betweenness [28]. 
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In order to gain more understanding on how the network is likely to behave as a whole, let us 
address the question: if a node were removed, would the structure of the network become 
divided into disconnected clusters? One can consider several approaches to find the key nodes 
in the network which may act as enablers among otherwise disconnected groups and we find 
the nodes that connect the network by locating the vulnerable parts (see Hanneman and 
Riddle [29]). 
A total of 1,401 cut-points or key nodes were found, this means that around 8% of the nodes 
are relevant to keep the structure connected as it is, or in other terms, if we remove these 
nodes then the number of components and the average path lengths between the nodes would 
increase, leaving the network vulnerable to break. 
We run a simulation for the GCC that shows random removal of a fraction of nodes and 
another simulation considering strategically chosen nodes. Then we measure the average 
shortest path length < l > and the relative size of the GCC as functions of the percentage d of 
deleted nodes [2,30,31]. The results are displayed in Fig. 7. The effect of the targeted removal 
of nodes causes a quick growth in the average shortest path length until the GCC disappears, 
GCC(pc)=0 at a very low level of targeted damage (less than 10%). We will call this level the 
percolation threshold pc. It is noticeable that a weak but smart attack destroys the network. In 
the random removal of nodes the damage is less than in the targeted damage. We established 
that our network of payments has shown scale-free properties, and this kind of networks are 
resilient to random damage, so it is barely possible to destroy the network of payments by 
random removal, but if we remove the exact portion of particularly selected nodes, it breaks 
completely. This effect has been seen in financial systems in economic crisis before: 
companies or banks may declare in bankruptcy and the whole system stays healthy, but if 
certain organizations declare in bankruptcy then the whole system collapses.  
  
       (a)          (b) 
Fig. 7. Plots of the targeted and random damage over the network of payments. (a) The average shortest-path length < l > in 
the GCC plotted against the percentage of removed nodes. (b) The GCC plotted against the percentage of removed nodes. 
Continuous lines display the effect of the targeted removal and the dashed lines display the effect of the random removal of 
nodes. pc are the percolation thresholds, for each case. 
 
It is not rare that the GCC in heavy-tailed networks is resilient against random removal of 
nodes. If the degree distribution of the network is fat-tailed, then this fact determines the 
topology of the system. However, it might be possible that when removing nodes in a random 
way, the tail of the degree distribution changes and then the GCC structure would be damaged 
[2].  
There are other heuristic methods available in literature to calculate the optimal percolation 
threshold of nodes that breaks the network into disconnected clusters (such as high degree 
node, k-core, closeness and eigenvector centralities). However, a common characteristic in 
these approaches is that they do not necessarily optimize a measure that reflects the collective 
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influence arising from considering the entire influential nodes at once. Under a collective 
influence approach, nodes’ inherent strength and weakness arises collectively from the 
configuration of interactions they have with the other components. Morone and Makse [32] 
designed an algorithm suitable for large networks that has proven to perform better than other 
empirical methods because it predicts a smaller set of optimal influencer nodes (the nodes that 
destroy the network if removed).  
The collective influence of a node is defined as the product of the node’s reduced degree (the 
number of its nearest connections, ki, minus one), and the total reduced degree of all nodes kj 
at a distance ℓ from it (ℓ is defined as the shortest path) 
𝐶𝐼ℓ(𝑖) = (𝑘𝑖 − 1) ∑ (𝑘𝑗
𝑗∈𝜕Ball(𝑖,ℓ)
− 1),                                                                                              (15) 
where Ball( 𝑖, ℓ) is the set of nodes inside a ball of radius ℓ around node i. 𝜕Ball(𝑖, ℓ) is the 
frontier of the ball and comprises the nodes j that are at a distance ℓ from i. By computing the 
CI for each node, it is possible to find the ones with the highest collective influence and 
remove them. 
The collective influence algorithm maps the problem of optimal influence on the computation 
of the minimum structural amount of nodes that reduces the largest eigenvalue of the non-
backtracking matrix of the network (see Morone and Makse [32]).  
We performed a simulation using the CI approach, and the results are shown in Fig. 8. We 
measure the collective influence of a group of nodes as the fall in the size of the GCC which 
would occur if the nodes in question were eliminated. The figure shows the GCC when a 
fraction of its nodes is eliminated. The optimal percolation threshold occurs when removing 
around 6% of the nodes because that is the point where GCC(pc)=0. This result also implies 
that there are a huge number of companies with a large number of payments which in fact 
have a minor influence in the whole economic network.  
 
Fig. 8 shows a better performance than previous strategy used on Fig. 7 (which is based on a 
betweenness centrality and where the optimal percolation threshold is higher than in 
collective influence method).  
 
 
Fig. 8 GCC of the network of payments as a function of the percolation threshold pc by using the collective influence 
algorithm. 
A practical measure of correlations is the average nearest neighbor degree function. A 
network is called assortative if its nodes with a certain degree are more likely to have links 
with nodes of similar degree, and it is called disassortative when the contrary occurs. For 
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example, when low degree nodes are more likely connected with nodes of higher degrees, or 
when high degree nodes are more likely connected with low degree nodes.  
A method that calculates these aforementioned correlation measures is the average nearest 
neighbor degree function (see Serrano et al. [33,10]). The conditional probability of a node 
with degree 𝑘 to be connected to a node of degree 𝑘′ is defined as 
𝑃(𝑘′|𝑘) =  
𝑃(𝑘′, 𝑘)
𝑃(𝑘)
,                                                                                                                            (16) 
where 𝑃(𝑘′, 𝑘) is the probability of two nodes, with degree 𝑘′ and 𝑘 to be connected by a 
link. P(k) is the degree distribution. The average nearest neighbor degree function is defined 
as 
〈𝑘𝑛𝑛〉(𝑘) = ∑ 𝑘
′𝑃(𝑘′|𝑘)
𝑘′
.                                                                                                                (17) 
 
Previous studies [2] have shown that social networks usually have significant assortative 
mixing; biological, technological and other financial networks have shown disassortative 
mixing [17,24]. Fig. 9 shows the affinity of the connectivity network. The correlation is -0.18, 
which means there is a negative dependence between the degree of a node and the degrees of 
its neighbors; therefore the system exhibits disassortative mixing. The function  〈𝑘𝑛𝑛〉(𝑘) 
decreases with 𝑘 suggesting that the high degree nodes, which are represented by companies 
who have many business partners such as service providers, clients or suppliers, usually have 
a large number of links to companies which have only one link (or just few), then the high 
degree nodes tend to connect with the low degree ones.  
 
 
Fig. 9 Affinity of the connectivity network.   
 
Disassortative mixing has implications for network resilience. For example, when this type of 
mixing is found, the attacks to the highest degree nodes are effective when trying to destroy 
the network quickly because these nodes are being approximately distributed over the 
network and forming links on different paths between other nodes, hence, this characteristic 
makes our network particularly vulnerable to targeted attacks.  
4. Conclusion 
We studied the structure of the economic network of an entire country using Swedbank’s 
payments database. After extracting the network’s topology, characteristics and statistics we 
conclude that this economic network shares many of the features found in empirical complex 
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networks, such as scale-free degree distributions, small world characteristic and low 
clustering coefficient. 
Our results show that this economic network is disassortative in terms of degree. The system 
shows topological heterogeneity due to its heavy tails and scale-free structure in the degree 
distributions. This scale-free structure indicates that few companies in Estonia trade with 
many parties while the majority trade with only few.  
In our network, the clustering coefficient is low and disperse (more than 52% of the nodes 
have either a clustering coefficient of 0 or 1). A low coefficient is a fair result because it 
shows how companies perceive business partners change as an avoidable expense. A 
company might prefer to keep working with regular trading partners (for example: service 
providers, clients or suppliers) for a medium or long term instead of changing them often, in 
order to save money and time. 
The network is a small world with just 7 degrees of separation: in average any company can 
be reached by other only in a few steps. The connectivity is smaller than the overall clustering 
coefficient; therefore, the network cannot be classified as random.  
Regarding the diameter size of our network: it is high when compared with that of a random 
network (1.5 times higher). The diameter in our results suggests a preference for specific 
paths of money flows between companies. This preference refers to companies that trade 
more with specific parties over others based on decisions relative to costs saving, 
geographical location, convenience, or any other type of decision. 
We performed two separate analyses to reveal the robustness of our economic network. The 
first one is based on centralities and the second one is based on an approach focused on 
collective influencer nodes. First, we found the key nodes that prevent the network to break 
into disconnected components. The simulation for the GCC assuming a targeted removal of 
key nodes causes a quick growth in the average shortest path length until the GCC disappears 
at a percolation threshold of 8%, while in the random removal the damage is extremely small. 
This revealed the robustness of our economic network against random attacks but also 
revealed its vulnerability to smart attacks. 
In the second analysis we followed the collective influence strategy. The percolation threshold 
is close to 6%; therefore, the performance of the optimal percolation threshold is better when 
following this method because it reduces the percentage substantially. The interpretation for 
this low level of optimal percolation threshold is that there are a lot of companies with 
enormous amounts of payments that have a weak influence in the economic network as a 
whole, and this also reveals that the most influential companies in the network are not 
necessarily the most connected ones or those having more economic activity. Both results 
agree on the fact that a small portion of economic entities maintains the whole network 
unified. 
5. Acknowledgments 
Algorithms in UCINET [34] and Pajek [35] were used to calculate network statistics and 
images. We thank Swedbank AS for enabling us with the data set for the analysis. This 
research was supported by the European Union through the European Regional Development 
Fund (project TK 124). 
14 
 
6. Tables 
Table 1. Network's characteristics 
Companies analyzed 16,613 
Total number of payments analyzed 2,617,478 
Value of transactions 3,803,462,026 * 
Average value of transaction per customer 87,600 * 
Max value of a transaction 121,533 * 
Min value of a transaction (aggregated in whole year) 1,000 * 
Average volume of transaction per company  60 
Max volume of transaction per company 24,859 
Min volume of transaction per company (aggregated in whole year) 20 
*All money amounts are expressed in monetary units. 
Table 2. Scaling exponents and clustering coefficients for different types of reported networks 
Type Network Exponent Clustering coefficient* References 
Economical 
Bank of Japan payments  γ = 2.1 -  [16] 
US Federal Reserve Bank  
γi = 2.11 
0.53 [17] γo = 2.15 
Austrian Interbank Market payments  
γi = 1.7 
0.12 [18] γo = 3.1 
Technological 
WWW 
γo = 2.4 
- [36] γi =2.1 
Peer-to-peer network γ = 2.1 0.012 [37] 
Digital electronic circuits γ = 3 0.03 [38] 
Social 
Film actors γ = 2.3 0.78 [4] 
Email messages 
γi = 1.5 
0.16 [39] γo = 2.0 
Telephone call γ = 2.1 - [40] 
Biological 
Protein interactions (yeast) γ = 2.4 
0.022 [41] 
Metabolism reactions 
γi = 2.2 
γo = 2.2 0.32 [42] 
Energy lancscape for a 14-atom cluster γ = 2.78 0.073 [43] 
γi = scaling exponent for in-degree distribution. γo = scaling exponent for the out-degree distribution. γ = scaling exponent for 
the connectivity distribution. *Refers to average clustering coefficient. 
Table 3. Summary of Statistics  
Statistic Value Components   # of nodes 
N 16613 GCC 15434 
# Payment 2617478 DC 1179 
Undirected Links 43375 GSCC 3987 
< k > 20 GOUT 6054 
γo 2.39 GIN 6172 
γi 2.49 Tendrils 400 
γ  2.45 Cutpoints 1401 
< C > 0.183 Bi-component 4404 
< l >  7.1 k-core 1081 
C 0.13 
D 29 
< σ > (nodes) 110 
< σ > (links) 40 
N = number of nodes. <k> = average degree. γo = scaling exponent for the out-degree empirical distribution. γi = scaling 
exponent for the in-degree empirical distribution. γ = scaling exponent for the connectivity degree distribution. <C> = 
average clustering coefficient. < l > = average shortest path length. C = connectivity per cent. D = Diameter. < σ > = average 
betweenness. 
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